The battle between Kantianism and Utilitarianism

Yesterday in lecture, we started to discuss John Mill’s extension on Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, according to Mill, is the basis for determining what is useful in producing happiness and is therefore the basis of the Greatest Happiness Principle. According to this principle, a morally good action produces the greatest amount of pleasure (and the least amount of pain) for the greatest amount of people. The only way this is possible is by examining the consequences of potential actions in certain circumstances (or moreover, consequentialism). Consequentialism has two principles which are: an action is right or wrong depending on the results of the action and the more good results (consequences) an act produces, the more right that action is. Mill’s view on consequentialism vastly differs from Kant’s view, whom rejects consequentialism all together. According to Kant, the moral worth of an action is not determined by it’s consequences but instead by the reason of that action. Moreover, a moral action is done with respect to morality itself and without motives. Hence, Kant identifies a priori knowledge which is the knowledge independent of experience. A prior knowledge is the only knowledge which fits the needed requirements for Kant’s definition of moral worth. Essentially, a priori knowledge is a fit since our actions will take place under different circumstances; therefore it is impossible to know the consequences of our actions and depends mostly on our personality. As Dr. J stated in class, one cannot agree with both Mill and Kant due to their different views of morality. Although it is understandable of the reasons of Kant’s view of morality, I do not completely agree with his philosophy. In my opinion, examining the consequences of a potential action is needed even though that consequence may turn out badly. By examining the consequences, we are able to do the best possible moral action or at least lead us in the right direction in determining the best action.